E one agent (she), which can be any economic agent involved in a project or a rm, is the entrepreneur in the Chinese non-state sector scenario G the other agent (he), which can also be any economic agent, is the government in the Chinese scenario p the probability of the white state and the black state has probability of 1 − p. p and θ have independent distributions k E the initial investment that agent E makes in a protable project or rm
Introduction
Conventional economic wisdom tells us well dened property rights lead to prosperity in a free market. This conventional wisdom is intuitive. If an individual is guaranteed the benets of his labor on a plot of land, one would expect that individual to work harder on that plot than if the benets of his labor had a serious possibility of being taken from him. Microeconomics tells us that the lower probability of benet resulting from ambiguous property rights should to lower marginal eort as compared to well dened property rights.
Clearly dened property rights guarantee the owner control in virtually all situations (with the exclusion of those specied beforehand in the contract). Ambiguous property rights provide no guarantee, and forces a party to ght for control whenever that party desires control.
If ambiguous property rights limit productivity, then no country wielding ambiguous property rights could be acting optimally. China provides a striking example of a country wielding ambiguous property rights. Even with private rms, ambiguous property rights are commonplace and rarely protected (Li 2). Studies from Svejnar, Weitzman and Xu show that rm ownership form does not impact productive eciency in China (Li 2). How can we explain the existence of ambiguous property rights in the prosperous Chinese non-state sector?
Li explains the ambiguous property rights as a response to high transaction costs and high uncertainties in the market. He characterizes the Chinese market as a gray market. In the Chinese market, the government is always a threat to block actions of the rm. This provides incentive for rms to team up with the government under ambiguous property rights, so that if a rm needs the services of the government to make a transaction possible, government services are at the rm's disposal. This luxury comes at the cost of the uncertainty of obtaining control after the government enables the transaction, and also the negotiating costs plus the monetary cost of buying control back from the government. A black market is the state where a rm needs the government's help, while a white market is the state where the government's help is not needed. Thus a gray market occurs when a rm is unsure whether a white or black state will occur. Ambiguous property rights can only be optimal in the cases of gray markets, where rms never know when they will need the governments help to pass a transaction. Gray markets are a form of market imperfection.
Li has two purposes for this paper. First, he strives to dene ambiguous property rights from cases in the past regarding transition economies. Next he proposes a theory based on an intuitive model. The model starts with agent E, who nds a project he deems protable and invests k E in the project. In a later period, depending on whether a black or white state occurs, either the eort of E (white state) or the eort of another party G (black state) is needed for completion.
E is unable to enter contingent contracts, and must decide whether to be the sole owner of the project or to bring G in as an ambiguous owner. Bringing in G as an ambiguous owner is only benecial in the black state, where E will need G to complete the project; but with ambiguous ownership, E is forced to ght G for control in the next period. As a sole owner, E keeps all rewards in the white state, but at the expense of not being able to receive any prots in the black state without negotiating with G. These negotiations are assumed to be more costly than in the case with ambiguous ownership, and there is a real possibility that E is not able to obtain G's services (thus receiving zero prot). Li summarizes the choice of ownership succinctly, as the choice of ownership form is dependent on how likely G is to be productive and how E and G negotiate when G is not an ambiguous owner (Li 3).
Notice the generality of the model proposed by Li. The model does not require E and G to be the rm and the government; instead, the possibilities of what these two parties can be are limitless. Li extends the model by mentioning a case where G is a lawyer who negotiates deals with other economic institutions. Some other extensions of Li's model include athletes (E) and agents (G), workers (E) and unions (G), and civilians (E) and the local maa (G).
The assumption that negotiations are more costly without ambiguous property rights stems from Li's assumption that property rights' arrangements aect information ows. Li assumes that the rights' holder has superior information on the project, which can lead to inecient negotiations between the rights' holder and an outsider. This assumption is similar to the arguments made by Wiliamson (1985) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) , and provide a crucial distinction between Li and the theory of ownership proposed by Grossman and Hart (1986) , and Moore (1990) . The next section will provide a more in depth background of the situation in China, followed by the theory.
2
The 
Assumptions
Assumption 1:
Assumption 1 tells us that costs increase with E's original investment, and that the cost function is convex.
Assumption 2: At time 1, it is common knowledge that θ∼Uniform [0, 1]
At time 1, as a result of Li's assumption regarding ownership's eects on information ows, it is dicult for outsiders to access the protability of the rm. Let protability be measured by θ.
This assumption serves to simplify the model.
We suppose it is common knowledge at time 0 that the white state has probability p and the black state has probability 1-p. This distribution of states is independent of the distribution θ.
Assumption 3 tells us that prot in the white state (π W ) depends on θ, productivity of E in the white state (q E ), E's eort level (a E ), and E's investment in period 1 (k β E ). This assumption also tells us the prot function is Cobb-Douglas. Assume the disutility of eort is U(a E ).
Assumption 4 simply tells us that disutility increases as eort increases and that the disutility of eort function is convex.
In the black state, E cannot prot without the help of G. Assume G's eort comes in an amount of xed capital k G . If G is to help the rm, G's eort must be k G and k G can only be provided by G. The opportunity cost of k G is r 0 k G . For simplicity purposes, Li avoids the issue of how E and G bargain for prot. When they bargain with symmetric information, assume E's relative bargaining power in the Nash bargaining sense is δ E .
Assumption 6: In the case of ambiguous ownership, when E and G bargain under perfect knowledge of θ, E gets δ E >0 proportion of the total surplus
With symmetric information, E gets a proportion of total surplus equal to his bargaining power.
The bargaining power of E only comes into play under ambiguous property rights.
Assumption 7: With private property rights, when E and G bargain in the market, the uninformed G acts like a monopolist.
Information asymmetry, which results from Li's assumption regarding ownership's eects on information ows, can lead to the break down of bargaining and ineciency. Acting as a monopolist, the price set by G is so high that sometimes E cannot reach a deal with G.
Sequences of information 1. Unambiguous Property Rights
Unambiguous property rights case
For the unambiguous property rights case, the E doesn't know the private information of the rm, so he can't share the prot of the rm. Thus E owns all the prot it makes in the white states.
And E have to buy the service from G for helping it in the black state.
In the white state, E has all the prot
In the black state, E will be unproductive. So if it doesn't buy the service from the G in advance, it will have zero prot. On the other hand, E has the choice to buy the service from G to be helped in advance, and the eort must be k G .
On G's side, as this service can only be provided by G, G has monopoly power and it can set the service price, r, in order to maximize its expected payo. So E has to pay rk G in total to buy the service. Thus By assumption 5, in the black states with help from G, we have π B = θk E . So E will buy the service from G as long as θk E − rk G 0, that is, only for
The rst order condition is
Back to E's side, if E belongs to the types which will buy the service, its expected payo in the black state will be:
Ambiguous property rights case
For the ambiguous property rights case, E and G will bargain for the actual control in each state.
In the white state, only E is productive; while in the black state, only G is productive. E and G cooperate with each other so that G lets E have all the control in the white state, while E lets G have all the control in the black state. And no matter which state it will be, G gets 1 − δ E of the prot and E gets δ E of the prot.
In the white state, the whole prot E can make is
E is going to get
In the black state, as G has the whole control of the rm now, G will choose to invest k G only if the type of E satises:
So the whole prot G can make is
As the probability of the white state is p and the probability of the black state is 1 − p, E's problem will be:
3.3 Property Rights and the Market Environment
The rst-best outcome can be achieved when E obtains unambiguous control rights all the time and when E can have access to k G at the price of r 0 . We can determine the optimal level of investment in the rst-best outcome as follows. In a white state, only E is productive, so social welfare is given by the prot to E minus the cost to E:
This expression means that E gets the full return to its investment and does not have to bargain with G to split rents.
In a black state, only G is productive, but invests only if the return to doing so is greater than the associated opportunity cost, θk E ≥ r 0 k G 1 . Then social welfare in a black state is given by:
In the rst-best case G invests k G at the cost of r 0 , and E retains the full surplus of the project because it is the one making the entire investment.
To nd the total expected social welfare, account for the probability p of realizing a white state, and the probability 1 − p of realizing a black state:
1 Do not confuse with equation (3) in the paper, θk E ≥ rk G , which gives the condition under which rm E in an unambiguous, black state can aord to be rescued by G at the monopolist price r.
The LHS of the expression is the marginal social benet of investing k E in a project, and the RHS marginal social cost of investing.
This is similar to the concept of contingent property rights (see the bottom of page 2). In a white state, E retains full control and receives the full return to its investment; in a black state G intervenes and receives the returns to the project.
LEMMA 2
So long as a gray market exists, p < 1, both private and ambiguous property rights result in too little investment k E , relative to the rst-best property rights arrangement.
Neither of the two property rights structures that the paper proposes give rise to a level of investment that is as high as the rst-best case. If rm E retains full control, then in the event of a black state, G will charge a monopoly price r to intervene. If both E and G share ambiguous rights, then the ineciency arises in a white state -rm E cannot get the full return to it's investment because the rms must negotiate over rents in t 2 , resulting in a fraction δ E for E.
This result can be shown by comparing the Docs for the optimal levels of investment by E in each state:
(I) Optimal investment in the rst-best case 
Clearly,
This means that rm E will invest less if it is the sole owner of property rights as compared to the rst best case.
(III) Ambiguous ownership between E and G [expression (14) in the handout, obtained by PROPOSITION 2
Ceteris paribus, the lower the r 0 K G , the more likely that a rm with ambiguous property rights is more ecient than a privately owned rm.
The expression forp is decreasing in the opportunity cost of G's investment. From the expression forp, we can see that as r 0 K G decreases, the threshold value ofp increases, making the range over which ambiguous rights yield a higher level of investment than under unambiguous rights greater. Since r 0 K G is the opportunity cost for G to rescue E in a black state, a lower value means that G is a more ecient co-owner, so E is more likely to share ownership.
PROPOSITION 3
Ceteris paribus, the higher the productivity of E, q E , the more likely that a private rm solely owned by E is more ecient than an ambiguously owned rm between E and G.
The expression forp is decreasing in q E , so an increase in the productivity level of rm E means that it tolerates a lower probability of a white state before it becomes willing to share property rights. If rm E is more productive, then it is more likely to hold on to full ownership in order to retain the full returns to its investment.
Conclusions and Future Discussion
Ambiguous Property Rights Theory: When transactions in the marketplace are costly, ambiguous property rights may prove to be more ecient than clearly dened property rights.
Contributions:
In an imperfect market of transitional economies, many transactions may incur potential illegitimacy or high transaction costs given grayness and imperfections of the market (for instance, governments may block some kinds of market transactions). Under this circumstance, ambiguous property rights become entrepreneur's choices because they are comparatively more ecient. Ambiguous property rights can be a market solution to market imperfections in transitional economies.
Shortcomings:
However, this paper doesn't give out a reasonable explanation for the declination of the Chinese non-state sector after the 1990s. According to the widely held belief in economics, institutions of clearly dened property rights are preconditions for economic prosperity. Once the market gets more transparent, more people would opt for dened property rights, which is a trend in today's China.
